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 Entitlement and belonging: social restructuring and multicultural Britain 
On 12 May 2016, two flagship measures of the current UK Conservative government 
received Royal Assent, and passed into law – the Housing and Planning Act 2016 and the 
Immigration Act 2016. The coincidence of their timing is not fortuitous. For while each 
contains measures that will further seriously disadvantage the lives of the most 
marginalised in society, taken together they amount to a large-scale restructuring of the 
social landscape that will inflict severe damage on the already battered fabric of 
multicultural Britain, particularly its inner-city communities, with such neighbourhoods 
being increasingly broken up and displaced.1 While the Housing Act provides for yet 
further evictions, displacement of families and breaking up of communities – in the wake 
of the damage already wrought by welfare ‘reforms’, including the ‘cap’ on welfare 
benefits and the bedroom tax2 – the Immigration Act extends the concept of creating a 
‘hostile environment’ to deter immigration into an operative principle underlying every 
social interaction, whether with the landlord, the employer, the school, the doctor, the 
social worker. 
In one sense, the two Acts can be seen as a culmination of attempts by both Labour- and 
Conservative-led governments to codify social entitlements in Britain, link rights to 
responsibilities and exclude certain categories of people from rights altogether. Extremes 
of poverty in inner-city neighbourhoods will be exacerbated, leaving children among those 
increasingly vulnerable to destitution. For example, local authorities will have no duties to 
assess provision for Gypsies and Travellers when assessing housing need. And the 
extension of the ‘hostile environment’ principle will lead to a deterioration in the quality 
of life for BAME communities. A climate of suspicion and mistrust will develop as those 
from BAME communities are forced to prove their immigration status before receiving 
services. And, while vast new powers are accumulated by government agencies 
responsible for administering the legislation, mechanisms to scrutinise and hold the 
government to account will be fatally weakened. 
This article is necessarily based on research carried out before the implementation of the 
Acts, using information taken from a wide range of sources, including organisations 
working in immigration, welfare and social policy, as well as statistical data. Where 
possible, this is used to provide an indication of how these bills will impact, and 
upon whom. My analysis also draws on four interviews that were carried out at the end of 
2015 with representatives of voluntary sector organisations whose case-work informs 
activism around racial justice – in such areas as access to justice, welfare, migration, 
homelessness and poverty. Questions explored the interplay between racism and austerity, 
the links between social policy, immigration policy and the criminal justice system, the 
manner in which policies are being delivered in this context and legislative developments 
that reinforce them. 
Mutual reinforcement 
Both Acts, as indicated, reinforce each other, containing measures that are central to the 
government’s ‘one nation’ agenda. When David Cameron gave his maiden speech as the 
leader of a majority Conservative government on 8 May 2015, he congratulated the former 
coalition he had led on the ‘foundations’ that it had laid, before suggesting that ‘the real 
opportunities lie ahead’. ‘When I stood here five years ago, our country was in the grip of 
an economic crisis’, he said. But ‘I truly believe we are on the brink of something special 
… We can make Britain a place where a good life is in reach for everyone who is willing 
to work and do the right thing.’3 
The legislative programme for achieving this, set out a few weeks later in the Queen’s 
Speech 2015, was introduced under the rhetoric of a new ‘One Nation 
Government’.4 With a ‘mandate for renewal’, twenty-seven bills were introduced covering 
welfare, policing, counter-extremism, devolution, education, human rights, trade unions, 
surveillance and data retention, and more. And within this wholesale strategy of state 
restructuring were the Housing and Planning and Immigration Bills 2015–2016. 
The Immigration Act includes measures which will expand the powers of immigration 
officers yet further, continues a commitment to integrating immigration enforcement 
within mainstream services and criminalises undocumented workers,5 rendering them ever 
more vulnerable to exploitation. The Housing Act includes measures which will end 
secure tenancies, force the sale of property – transferring public land into private hands – 
and ultimately force rents higher in an upward spiral. Whereas the former is focused on 
addressing who can reside in the country, the latter addresses who can reside where. And 
in doing so, the impact on the poor and marginalised will be devastating. The elderly, 
victims of domestic violence and those with health problems will be left vulnerable by the 
phasing out of secure tenancies. Some 60,000 people, it is estimated, may be unable to 
remain in their home as a result of ‘pay-to-stay provisions’. Families will be separated. 
People in receipt of disability allowance, for example, may be penalised. Taken together, 
the two Acts represent a significant step towards restructuring the face of urban Britain, 
providing a pretext for the mass, accelerated displacement of those who do not fit within 
contemporary vernaculars of urban living – breaking-up multicultural communities in the 
process. They will isolate people from family networks and community infrastructures. 
Ultimately, they will undermine the formal mechanisms which hold state agencies to 
account. 
An overview of some of the key measures in the Acts is provided in Table 1. 
Table 1. A brief overview of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 and the Immigration Act 
2016. 
 
Key concerns 
Who is able to live where they desire in the UK? Who is included within the myriad 
vernaculars of urban renewal? Who, ultimately, is included within the fervent appeal to 
‘one nation’? These are the questions implied by the two Acts. And the most searching 
thinking on this is coming from those residents forced to resist their impacts, and the 
grass-roots networks resisting alongside them. It is significant that many of these networks 
have emerged in multicultural neighbourhoods often the target of aggressive regeneration 
strategies and processes of gentrification. Against this backdrop it is possible to see how 
the new legislation will mean the poor increasingly being displaced, homelessness and 
destitution intensified and a climate of suspicion and mistrust against BAME communities 
legitimised. 
Urban renewal and the displacement of the poor 
With their respective aims of enforcing norms of property ownership, freeing up land for 
investors, removing some people from certain forms of housing and others from the 
country, the two Acts reinforce a resurgent wave of gentrification, ‘reclaiming’ space for a 
new set of cultural and economic elites. Frequently (but by no means always), these areas 
are inner-city estates and localities where black and Asian communities settled in the post-
war period. And it is here that contemporary debates over social policy, welfare reform 
and immigration policing are being played out, and networks of resistance, mutual support 
and protest are emerging. 
Referring to a series of work-related immigration raids in Deptford, southeast London, the 
Anti-Raids Network (ARN) has pointed out that ‘One interpretation … could be that they 
are a purposeful attempt to undermine the economic base of minority stallholders on the 
market, to make it appear an even more attractive investment to real estate 
speculators.’13 As ARN makes clear, the goals of immigration policy should not be 
distinguished from broader attempts to transform particular localities through a narrative 
of urban renaissance. And it is in such contexts that the Housing and Planning Act and the 
Immigration Act will contribute to ongoing processes of ‘social cleansing’. To take just 
one example, despite ferocious resistance in London, around 500 families are being 
displaced from their homes every week by current restructuring processes, even before the 
full effect of the Acts is felt.14 Summed up by one collective as combining ‘moving out 
undesirable humans’ with ‘sanitising and securing the social environment for those who 
remain’,15 these processes are underpinned by a series of ideological assumptions 
about who belongs in particular localities, with the multicultural poor among those 
deemed eminently disposable. 
Already, evictions are being carried out at record levels in England, with nearly 43,000 
tenants evicted from rented accommodation in 2015, or more than 170 per day (over half 
from privately rented accommodation).16 And as figures from the homelessness charity 
Shelter reveal, there are stark geographical differences. Between October 2013 and 
September 2014, possession claims (including mortgage possession claims) – the first 
stage of a legal process which can lead to eviction – were made on one in thirty-six 
households in Newham, one in thirty-eight households in Barking and Dagenham and one 
in forty-two households in Haringey, Southwark and Waltham Forest.17 It is London 
boroughs which dominate this list of repossession ‘hotspots’ – many of which are 
multicultural areas undergoing rapid processes of urban restructuring and ‘regeneration’. 
An extract of Shelter’s data, showing possession claims for twenty local authority 
‘hotspots’ in England in 2013/14, is shown in Table 2. I have added to this data on 
ethnicity, taken from the latest census (2011). 
Table 2. Possession claims for twenty local authorities identified as hotspots, October 2013–
September 2014. (All data except for that on ethnicity taken from Shelter.18Data on ethnicity 
taken from the Census 2011.) 
 
If these figures give an indication of the rapidity with which multicultural communities are 
broken up, the Housing and Planning Act is explicit about how it will facilitate these 
processes. With regard to housing entitlements, it obliges local authorities to ‘consider the 
needs of all the people residing in or resorting to their district, without any references to 
Gypsies and Travellers’. And as the Traveller Movement explains, this provision rests on 
a ‘perception’ that Gypsies and Travellers receive ‘differential treatment’ in the planning 
system – disregarding the evidence of ‘stigma and discrimination’ in society generally that 
Gypsies and Travellers actually, persistently, face. The impact, it continues, will be to 
‘exacerbate the existing chronic shortage of Traveller sites in England and result in an 
increase in unauthorised sites’.20 
Additionally, though, the Act includes measures which could accelerate a broader forced 
displacement of the marginalised. According to Architects for Social Housing (ASH), the 
Housing and Planning Act amounts to an ongoing land-grab which, by obliging local 
housing authorities to sell ‘high value’ housing, serves as a pretext ‘either to transfer 
public housing into private hands or to free up … coveted land for property 
developers’.21 It sounds the death knell for security of tenure (already being eroded prior 
to the Act’s passing), and it provides the legislative mechanisms through which social 
housing can practically be obliterated. Duties will be placed on local authorities to build 
starter homes for first-time buyers, price-capped, as Shelter has shown, at such a level that 
they will be unaffordable for people on average incomes in around half of the country and 
some 98 per cent of people across the country on low incomes. And one outcome of all of 
this will be to reinforce the inequities of burgeoning rental markets which increasingly 
force people out of areas they cannot afford. During the passage of the bill, attempts to 
impose the most basic forms of regulation have been sabotaged. 312 MPs ensured that an 
amendment requiring rented homes to be ‘fit for human habitation’ was rejected in 
January 2016. Significantly, it has emerged that at least seventy-three of them, including 
the prime minister, earn money as landlords.22 
The end of social housing and the intensification of homelessness 
As various commentators have made clear, the Housing and Planning Act does not just 
undermine social housing, it ‘marks the end of the social housing era’.23 Even the 
Conservative-linked Local Government Association warns that around 80,000 council 
homes will disappear by 2020, with homes sold under the right-to-buy scheme not being 
replaced.24 Other estimates put this number above 190,000.25 Either way, it will accelerate 
the impact of decades of decline, and the combination of right-to-buy schemes and the 
forced sell-off of council properties will contribute to the eradication of affordable (in the 
real sense of the word) housing, in favour of that which is accessible only to a select few. 
Against a backdrop of £12 billion welfare cuts – added to the £35 billion spending cuts 
that have already been administered and a series of welfare ‘reforms’ including, for 
example, the ‘bedroom tax’ and the benefit cap26 – the impact will be to compound 
already existing inequalities. 
According to the Race Equality Foundation, it is Caribbean, Bangladeshi and African 
communities who are most likely to live in social rented accommodation (around 40, 35 
and 40 per cent respectively),27 thus making them particularly vulnerable to some of the 
new changes. This is compounded by labour market discrimination which, for example, 
led to a nearly 50 per cent increase in the number of 16–24 year olds from BAME 
communities experiencing long-term unemployment between 2010 and 2015.28 At the 
same time, substantial cuts to housing benefit for young people and other groups leave 
thousands in an increasingly precarious position, with one impact being the intensification 
of already rocketing homelessness. Nearly two million people are on housing waiting lists 
in Britain. Around 30 per cent of ‘statutory homeless acceptances’ are a result of assured 
shorthold tenancies coming to an end. According to the Department of Communities and 
Local Government’s (DCLG) own figures, the number of Asian and black households 
assessed as being ‘unintentionally homeless’ and in priority need of housing increased by 
33 and 21 per cent respectively between 2012 and 2015. The number of homeless families 
housed in bed and breakfast accommodation increased in the same period by over 300 per 
cent (to 2,570 families in March 2015), with BAME families making up some 55 per cent 
of those living in temporary accommodation.29 The legislation, meanwhile, contains 
provisions which make it easier for landlords to evict tenants from ‘abandoned’ properties, 
increasing the coercive powers available in order to bypass any semblance of due process. 
The ‘hostile environment’ 
If the Housing and Planning Act reinforces a range of policy measures framing where 
particular communities will reside, the Immigration Act is committed to creating a ‘hostile 
environment’ for those who can be removed from the country. Rolling out ‘right to rent’ 
checks on a national scale, it has made immigration profiling a legal duty, with landlords 
facing penalties of up to £3,000 per tenant if they fail to comply. Although the extension 
of immigration control into everyday life is not new, the commitment to the creation of a 
hostile environment takes this further. The aim is to continue a long-standing strategy of 
making life intolerable for undocumented migrants and refused asylum seekers so as to 
force them to leave, as migrants’ rights groups have emphasised repeatedly. And it is in 
this context that, for example, further restrictions on healthcare should be read, or the 
bolstering of powers to deny financial support (including to families with children). One 
of the impacts, no doubt, will be to drive more people into undocumented working so as to 
survive. But for those who do so, new powers which criminalise undocumented working 
allow the state to confiscate their meagre earnings as ‘proceeds of crime’. 
A timeline of some of the key measures and strategies promoted and led by the 
Conservatives to create a hostile environment are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Creating a hostile environment – a timeline of key events. 
 
Fidelis Chebe is a project co-ordinator at Migrant Action, a project supporting vulnerable 
migrants in Leeds. For him, the Immigration Act creates and utilises the most extreme 
forms of poverty; and like the Housing and Planning Act, it contains measures to 
coercively respond to those impacted. ‘Look at what’s in it’, he said: 
First, it will result in families whose asylum claims are refused losing their support 
completely. Straightaway, they’ll join the thousands of adults that this already happens 
to each year. Second, when children in care who have an irregular status turn adults 
they will immediately be denied support. And this, by design, is an attempt to make 
them leave the country. So what is the message here? The message is that there will be 
an increased resort to the worst forms of destitution as a tool of deportation. 
Such strategies are not new. The use of destitution as an adjunct to immigration and 
asylum policy, originating in Conservative reforms in the mid-1990s, was institutionalised 
by New Labour at the beginning of the twenty-first century. But they are being intensified 
to such an extent that, as the Red Cross pointed out, last year, a ‘record’ number of people 
are now being forced into homelessness.30 It is a point reiterated by Laurie Ray, a case-
worker at the Leeds-based Positive Action for Refugees and Asylum Seekers (PAFRAS). 
PAFRAS’ twice-weekly ‘drop-in’ service for refused asylum seekers – providing advice, 
support, free food, clothing and signposting – received around 270 ‘visits’ a month in 
2007. Now, however, despite this drop-in service operating only once a week, because of 
lack of funds, about 160 people come each week. ‘That’s crept up on us’, he said in 
interview. ‘If you compare that to a few years ago, the increase in people is quite 
substantial. We expect it to become more so.’ 
At the same time, economic worth is increasingly determining rights, including that of 
being able to stay in the UK. Extending New Labour’s managed migration policies, 
proposals (from 2012, but now being put in place) to allow for the removal, for example, 
of certain non-EU migrants who fail to earn £35,000 per year, after five years, could open 
the door to the deportation of thousands of people on the basis that they are not wealthy 
enough.31 And along with measures such as the £18,600 income threshold – to enable 
(non-EU) spouses to enter the UK – migrants are being reduced to units of capital, or the 
output of their labour. ‘We need to understand what is happening as a way of shaping who 
has entitlements to rights, justice and ultimately life’, Fidelis Chebe stated: 
Wealth is one determiner of access to rights. The [immigration] bill seeks to make life 
as ‘hostile’ as possible for anyone who is not seen as deserving of rights – the poorest 
migrants, those who have fallen foul of the system. These are the communities it is 
designed to break up. 
A SUS culture 
The impact, though, will reach much further. By creating a system whereby immigration 
profiling becomes a legal duty, it is inevitable that ‘settled’ BAME communities will be 
affected. The government’s own evaluation of a six-month ‘right to rent’ pilot, beginning 
in 2014, included an exercise where undercover ‘shoppers’ enacted scenarios with 
landlords to see how they applied the scheme. It revealed ‘instances where agents and 
landlords appeared to imply an element of discrimination’.32 The Joint Council for the 
Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI), meanwhile, carried out a separate, independent 
evaluation, showing that 25 per cent of landlords would be less likely to rent to someone 
with a ‘foreign name’ or a ‘foreign accent’, 42 per cent would be less likely to rent to 
someone who could not produce a British passport and that checks were being applied 
against people who ‘appear’ foreign.33 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the checks 
have been described by various commentators as contemporary versions of the ‘no dogs, 
no blacks, no Irish’ cards advertising rooms for rent in the 1960s–1970s.34 
This is reminiscent of the discredited SUS laws,35 facilitating arbitrary and wrongful 
arrest, legitimised by the blanket ‘suspicion’ of a particular community. Nearly four 
decades ago, in evidence to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (1979), the IRR 
showed (in its description of a SUS 1 (for young black people) and a SUS 2 (for Asian 
people)) how immigration laws were giving the police powers to arrest without a warrant 
anyone suspected of being an ‘illegal entrant’.36 It is this SUS 2 which is now being 
extended. The roll-out of right to rent provisions, as stated above, will also roll out 
discrimination. So too will measures to create an offence of ‘driving while illegal’, for 
example, or the duties placed on banks to police the immigration status of their customers. 
One outcome of the ‘hostile environment’ will be the increased normalisation of 
immigration policing. 
Enforcement 
Together the two Acts are effectively creating new mechanisms through which a social 
restructuring, based on a set of assumptions about rights and responsibilities, entitlement 
and belonging, is taking place. Measures including, for example, the criminalisation of 
undocumented working, the expansion of immigration officers’ powers (the Immigration 
Act) and the extension of already formidable eviction powers (the Housing and Planning 
Act) indicate how coercion and enforcement are paramount in government thinking. But 
as interviewees for this research repeatedly told us, the social restructuring the government 
desires cannot come about through legislation alone. It demands a strong degree of 
collaboration and enforcement by non-statutory agencies. 
Rita Chadha is the Chief Executive of the Refugee and Migrant Forum of Essex and 
London (RAMFEL).37 She discussed how the Immigration Act’s increased co-option of 
private sector agencies (such as banks, landlords and employers) as de facto immigration 
officers was taking place in conjunction with the increased collaboration of civil society 
and ‘third sector’ agencies (charities, NGOs, etc.) as immigration enforcement agencies. 
These are not new processes, but as they amplify the expansion of immigration control 
into the vagaries of everyday life, they facilitate an intensification of information-sharing 
and ‘networking’ whereby seemingly disparate state agendas come to work in tandem, 
with serious ethical considerations for the voluntary sector. 
‘In London’, she stated: 
It was said a few years ago that there were too many homeless charities duplicating 
work and that they should combine. And you could see that with the way 
commissioners and procurement has worked for a lot of homeless charities. So for 
street-based homelessness, in each local area you have a commissioned service that is 
responsible for going out and verifying street sleepers; they have to see the person in 
situ, and they will give the person what is known as a chain number. That chain 
number is entered on to a database that homeless charities can access and find out what 
the case-work steps are for that client. 
However: 
We have raised huge concerns about how this chain database is used, who has got 
access to it, who certain charities are sharing information from it with and whether it is 
being used to target ‘hotspots’. So you have seen that in Brent. The operations that 
have happened there have been a result of somebody looking at that database and 
saying there is a cluster here of people here who ‘look like’ migrants, so we can engage 
in enforcement activity.38 [Another example] is Operation Alabama; this was started 
off by Newham council and based in an old shopping centre, which is covered and 
which has a public right of way, so it couldn’t be sealed off at night. During the night 
time a lot of homeless migrants bed down there. So what happened was a multi-agency 
enforcement operation. They called it Alabama. They said they had presented a social 
care model; we can’t find any evidence that any social care agencies gave any support 
there. [Twenty-eight ‘anti-social behaviour warnings’ were issued through the first 
night-time patrols under Operation Alabama. One person was detained as an 
overstayer; four people were told to report to UKBA offices; two people refused 
‘specialist help’ to leave the UK.] 
The point, here, is not just that immigration enforcement combines with ‘homelessness 
prevention’ activities in an increasing array of contexts. Nor is it just that certain third-
sector agencies are increasingly willing (or in some cases not so willing) parties to 
enforcement agendas under a rubric of ‘partnership’.39 Rather, such convergences are 
indicative of the long-standing shift in the role of welfare, from one ostensibly of universal 
support or care to a much more openly discriminating and punitive one, that dispossesses 
certain people of their rights and uproots them from where they live. That is, institutional 
structures, bodies and networks operate to remove support, or provide assistance on a 
conditional basis. With the conditions aimed at funnelling a person into a pre-determined 
and often authoritarian pathway. ‘For alcoholics and drug users’, Rita Chadha explained: 
The message is ‘clean yourself up’. For LGBT homeless people it is ‘it is your 
responsibility’. For migrants it is ‘go back home’. The idea is ‘you got yourself into 
this, so you get yourself out of it’. Most definitely. It is difficult to fight against this, as 
it is the most all-prevailing narrative. 
Indira Kartallozi, the founder of Chrysalis Family Futures, an organisation providing legal 
advice, family support and advocacy, confirms this. ‘I think that the welfare system is a 
deterrent system rather than a system that supports vulnerable people … Continued pieces 
of legislation are all going towards simplifying the system, but are making it inaccessible, 
especially by vulnerable or marginalised people.’ Giving the example of migrants with no 
‘settled’ status with no recourse to public funds, and in particular those with children, she 
explained: 
Through my work I send a lot of ‘Section 17’ referrals to social services, child-in-need 
referrals, because with families, if there is no recourse to public funds and there is a 
destitute child in need there is a statutory duty to protect the child regardless. That 
means if the child is homeless, they should be provided with shelter; if the child has no 
food, they should be provided with subsistence. 
In practice, though, she continued: 
These referrals should be assessed by social workers. But, instead they go for 
immigration assessment to a person that has no understanding of a child in need 
assessment. This is the new way that referrals are being averted. The immigration 
assessor might say the likelihood of you getting status is very poor, therefore you 
should make an effort to go back home to your country of origin. 
‘This is not care’, she concludes. ‘It is immigration control.’ And in this system of control, 
attempting to protect a child from the most desperate form of poverty facilitates, 
unwittingly, removal. 
The inversion of accountability 
With increasingly blurry distinctions between welfare, criminal justice, immigration 
control, the outcome resembles what political scientist Mark Neocleous, in a different 
context, has aptly described as ‘social policing’. This, he explains, reflects conceptually 
‘the expansive set of institutions through which policing takes place’.40 And, he continues, 
the outcome is to maintain, reproduce and fabricate a particular form of social order. The 
Housing and Planning and Immigration Acts contribute to this process and not only in the 
ways documented above. They also point to the eradication of mechanisms for holding the 
state to account for the harm and injustices that their combined measures will produce. 
Both Acts contain measures which will bypass the limited checks on power which systems 
of due process offer. Through the introduction of ‘fast track evictions’, the Housing and 
Planning Act adds to the already broad array of eviction powers available to landlords, 
granting them the power to remove tenants who are eight weeks behind in rent payments 
without having to gain a possession order from the courts. Taking away the ability to 
challenge evictions until after the event, could impact on all housing tenants. But it will 
particularly affect those in receipt of housing benefit, given that payments are frequently 
delayed.41 And this ‘fast-tracking’ of evictions finds a parallel in Immigration Act 
provisions which enable the summary eviction of tenants if it is revealed they are 
disqualified from renting. If a landlord receives notice of this from the Secretary of State, 
the tenant can be evicted without having to obtain a court order, and without judicial 
oversight. It is a measure that has been neatly described by one parliamentarian as 
‘Dickensian’.42 Building on the abolition of all immigration appeals (except for asylum 
cases and those on human rights grounds) in the Immigration Act 2014, the new Act also 
contains measures to remove the right to appeal against the refusal of support from refused 
asylum seekers. At the same time ‘deport first, appeal later’ provisions are extended so 
that all human rights appeals against removal, in which the Home Office deems that that 
there is no risk of ‘serious or irreversible harm’, will have to be exercised after leaving the 
UK and therefore after the removal has taken place. The new legislation reveals how the 
desire to rid the country, by any means necessary, of the ‘unentitled’ is removing the 
protections of due process from a whole section of people. 
Under construction then, is a system whereby executive power is being amassed at the 
same time that service delivery and enforcement of policy continues to be increasingly 
devolved to non-state agencies. It underpins what former immigration barrister Frances 
Webber has called the ‘inversion of accountability’. As governments grant themselves 
more powers, she explains, as they accept less accountability for their actions, civil society 
actors are increasingly being drawn into the ‘efficient’ delivery of immigration control. 
And in the process, it is they who become accountable to the state – subject to increasing 
control and regulation.43 
In such a subversion of accountability, the Housing and Planning Act, for example, 
enables the Communities Secretary to force public bodies to give up ‘surplus’ land for 
development and property speculation. Barriers in the form of planning permission could 
be overridden, for the legislation also makes provisions to open up the planning 
applications process to ‘alternative providers’. This market, as has been pointed out 
elsewhere, will enable developers to ‘shop around’ for providers who will most likely 
grant planning permission. According to one MP, this creates the potential to ‘generate a 
degree of corruption and totally inappropriate conflicts of interest’.44 
But these Acts, as interviewees for this research made clear, do not exist in isolation; and 
they are by no means the only ways through which mechanisms of accountability are 
being eroded. With legal aid under attack and funding to advice agencies being 
withdrawn, larger ‘established’ bodies with experience of contract delivery – and often a 
willingness to accept particular terms and conditions – are consolidating their already 
strong hold on ‘how’ services should be delivered, to the detriment of smaller 
organisations with a local community base. Rita Chadha, discussing the funding of both 
the migrants’ rights and homelessness ‘sectors’, noted how ‘bigger charities say they are 
the authoritative voice, when actually the reason they are the most authoritative voice is 
because they procured contracts that allowed them to be the authoritative voice, and they 
got them because they are not going to buck the system’. This, she continued, further side-
lines alternative views, for ‘when a select few “safe” organisations have that monopoly 
over the whole discussion, over the whole procurement process, any dissenting voices of 
course get squeezed’. 
And it should also be noted that there appears to be another overt policy of squeezing 
dissenting voices: the defanging of charities in terms of their capacity to lobby and 
criticise. The Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union 
Administration Act 2014 has created uncertainty amongst charities as to what they can 
properly do in terms of political campaigning and whether they need to register. Then it 
was revealed in January 2016, that gagging clauses were being inserted into government 
contracts with charity providers so as to prevent them from publicly criticising 
government policy, especially austerity measures. 
Not only are there attempts to cajole critical groups into a silent acquiescence over 
reactionary policies, but the thrust of the Housing and Immigration Acts, with their 
language of ‘entitlement’, is to turn neighbour against neighbour and thereby further 
undermine accountability. For Laurie Ray, this is what the entire narrative around legal aid 
and welfare cuts has attempted to achieve by ‘targeting so many groups: welfare rights, 
family law, employment, immigration and so on’, and attempting to pit them against each 
other. ‘This … tries to destroy solidarity.’ Fidelis Chebe, meanwhile, put it more bluntly: 
‘We know that this whole legislative project that is being put in place, this austerity 
project which it is part of, is ideological.’ 
Conclusion 
In January 2016, the Prime Minister proposed to ‘radically transform’ over 100 ‘sink 
estates’ across the country – reportedly including the Winstanley estate (Wandsworth), 
Lower Falinge (Rochdale) and Broadwater Farm (Tottenham) – through a £140 million 
scheme which would, in some cases, ‘knock them down and replace them’.45 The 
communities living on these estates, some 100,000 people, were described by Cameron as 
‘self-governing and divorced from the mainstream’. And although they would be offered 
‘binding guarantees’ that they would be able to return, evidence of other similar 
programmes suggests that the majority will not be able to do so.46 Under the narrative of 
urban renewal and regeneration, they are expendable. The ‘mission here’, Cameron says, 
is ‘nothing short of a social turnaround’. ‘I believe that together we can tear down 
anything that stands in our way.’47 
This is the light in which we should see the Housing and Planning Act 2016 and the 
Immigration Act 2016. They not only contribute to Cameron’s ‘social turnaround’ by 
providing the pretext for the removal of particular populations, but also to ‘tear[ing] 
down’ avenues of redress against this process, drawing in an increasing array of non-state 
agencies as adjuncts, even collaborators. The Acts may be only two elements in a much 
larger process of societal and state restructuring under neoliberalism, but they are central 
to it. 
References 
1. 
This is not an exhaustive study of the two Acts, but indicates the ways in which, in 
tandem, they will impact upon the lived reality of multicultural Britain. 
2. 
Although the welfare reforms are by no means the sole factor behind an 
intensification of evictions, they play a key role. See Smee Daniel, ‘UK 
Government’s housing policy targeting homeless families is “tantamount to social 
cleansing”’, Independent (3 April 2016), available 
at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/charities-call-for-urgent-
action-to-prevent-death-of-more-homeless-children-a6966601.html. Google Scholar 
3. 
Cameron David, ‘Election 2015: David Cameron speech in full’, BBC News 
(8 May 2015), available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
32661073. Google Scholar 
4. 
Cameron David, ‘An introduction by the Prime Minister’, Queen’s 
Speech 2015 (London: Prime Minister’s Office, 2015), p. 5. 
5. Previously, working without papers was an administrative but not a criminal offence. 
6. 
Kill the Housing Bill, ‘Why we must stop the Housing Bill 2015’ (2015), available 
at: http://www.defendcouncilhousing.org.uk/dch/resources/KtHBbriefingJan2016.pdf
. Google Scholar 
7. 
Akehurst Steve ‘Housing and Planning Bill: second reading briefing (House of 
Commons)’ (Shelter, October 2015), available 
at: https://england.shelter.org.uk/professional_resources/policy_and_research/policy_
library/policy_library_folder/briefing_housing_and_planning_bill_2015. Google 
Scholar 
8. 
Social Housing Under Threat (SHOUT), ‘Housing and Planning Bill: parliamentary 
briefing’ (November2015), available 
at: https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/4socialhousing/pages/148/attachments/ori
ginal/1446816455/Bill_briefing.pdf?1446816455. Google Scholar 
9. 
Architects for Social Housing, ‘Housing and Planning Bill: submission to the House 
of Commons Public Bill Committee’ (7 December 2015), available 
at: https://architectsforsocialhousing.wordpress.com/. Google Scholar 
10. 
Migrants’ Rights Network, ‘Briefing on the proposed immigration bill 2015–16’ 
(September 2015), available 
at: http://www.migrantsrights.org.uk/files/publications/MRN_Immigration_Bill_Brie
fing_2015-v2.pdf. Google Scholar 
11. 
Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, ‘Immigration Bill 2015 update’ 
(1 December 2015), available 
at: http://www.jcwi.org.uk/blog/2015/12/01/immigration-bill-2015-update. Google 
Scholar 
12. 
‘The immigration bill 2015-16 explained’, Electronic Immigration Network 
(9 October 2015), available at: https://www.ein.org.uk/blog/immigration-bill-2015-
16-explained. 
13. 
Anti-Raids Network, ‘Gentrification & immigration raids: report of raids on Deptford 
high street’ (ARN, 23April 2015), available 
at: https://network23.org/antiraids/2015/04/23/gentrification-immigration-raids-
report-of-raid-on-deptford-high-street/. Google Scholar 
14. 
Douglas Daniel ‘Over 50,000 families shipped out of London boroughs in the last 
three years due to welfare cuts and soaring rents’, Independent (29 April 2015), 
available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/over-50000-
families-shipped-out-of-london-in-the-past-three-years-due-to-welfare-cuts-and-
soaring-10213854.html. Google Scholar 
15. 
Some London Foxes, London 2016: the terrain of our struggle 
(London: Rabble, 2016), p. 13. Google Scholar 
16. 
Osbourne Hilary ‘Tenant evictions reach highest level on record’, Guardian 
(12 February 2016), available 
at: http://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/feb/11/tenant-evictions-highest-level-
england-wales-ministry-of-justice. Google Scholar 
17. 
Shelter, ‘Repossessions and eviction hotspots: September 2014’ 
(London: Shelter, 2014), available 
at: https://england.shelter.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/1031816/2014_Repo_H
otspots_September_Quarter_2014_Final.pdf. Google Scholar 
18. Shelter, ‘Repossessions and eviction hotspots: September 2014’. 
19. 
All data except for that on ethnicity taken from Shelter, Repossessions and eviction 
hotspots: September 2014’. It should be noted that BAME is taken in this context to 
include all those from ethnic groups which are not White: 
English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British. 
20. 
‘Housing and Planning Bill: written evidence submitted by the Traveller Movement’ 
(November 2015), available 
at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmpublic/housingplanning/
memo/hpb80.htm. 
21. 
Simon Elmer, ‘Let the children boogie’, Architects for Social 
Housing (14 January 2016), available 
at: https://architectsforsocialhousing.wordpress.com/. Google Scholar 
22. 
Wright James ‘David Cameron and his fellow Tory landlords vote against law to 
ensure housing “fit for humans”’, The Canary (14 January 2016), available 
at: http://www.thecanary.co/2016/01/14/david-cameron-fellow-tory-landlords-vote-
law-ensure-housing-fit-humans/. Google Scholar 
23. 
Toynbee Polly ‘A day in court showed me the misery of Britain’s housing policy’, 
Guardian (2 February2016), available 
at: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/02/day-in-court-britain-
housing-policy-bedroom-tax-government-cuts-evictions-poor-vulnerable. Google 
Scholar 
24. 
Johnstone Richard ‘LGA: 80,000 council homes under threat from Right-to-Buy 
reforms’, Public Finance (29 January 2016), available 
at: http://www.publicfinance.co.uk/news/2016/01/lga-80000-council-houses-under-
threat-right-buy-reforms. Google Scholar 
25. 
Mark Laura ‘Labour: Housing Bill could lead to loss of 200,000 council homes’, The 
Architect’s Journal (14 January 2016), available 
at: http://www.architectsjournal.co.uk/news/labour-housing-bill-could-lead-to-loss-
of-200000-council-homes/10001507.article. Google Scholar 
26. 
According to the sociologist Victoria Cooper (personal 
communication, 21 February 2016): ‘First introduced under the Welfare Reform Bill 
in 2011, the benefit cap limits the total weekly income an individual or family can 
receive in welfare benefits; however the cap, or reduction, is administered through 
housing benefit payment. Therefore, individuals and families that exceed the benefit 
cap will automatically see their housing benefits reduced. Although a local authority 
ordinarily calculates a range of benefits per household – child benefit, housing 
benefit, employment and support allowance, job seekers allowance and so forth – 
only their housing benefit is reduced when a household exceeds the benefit cap. The 
benefit cap, can also be understood as a rent cap, therefore, because individuals and 
families must make up the rent shortfall themselves and/or fall into rent 
arrears.’ Google Scholar 
27. 
Nissa Finney and Bethan Harries, Understanding Ethnic Inequalities in Housing: 
analysis of the 2011 census (London: Race Equality Foundation, 2013), p. 9. Google 
Scholar 
28. 
Taylor Matthew ‘50% rise in long term youth unemployment for young ethnic 
minority people in UK’, Guardian (10 March 2015), available 
at: http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/mar/10/50-rise-in-long-term-
unemployed-youngsters-from-uk-ethnic-minorities. Google Scholar 
29. 
Gayle Damien ‘Number of homeless families housed in B&Bs rises 300% in five 
years’, Guardian (24June 2015), available 
at: http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/jun/24/homelessness-england-families-
temporary-accommodation-bed-and-breakfast. Google Scholar 
30. 
Red Cross, ‘Record number of UK asylum seekers homeless as immigration bill 
looms’, Press release (14 January 2016), available 
at: http://www.redcross.org.uk/About-us/Media-centre/Press-
releases/2016/January/Record-number-of-UK-asylum-seekers-destitute-as-
Immigration-Bill-looms. Google Scholar 
31. 
For more information on this, see Bex Sumner, ‘Theresa May is going to deport 
thousands of people, for not being rich’, The Canary (22 January 2016), available 
at: http://www.thecanary.co/2016/01/22/theresa-may-start-deporting-people-earn-
less-35000-year/. Google Scholar 
32. 
Claire Brickall, Tom Bucke, Jonathan Burchell, Miriam Davidson, Ewan Kennedy, 
Rebbeca Linley and Andrew Zuruwan, ‘Evaluation of the Right to Rent Scheme: full 
evaluation report of phase one’, Research Report 83 (London: Home Office, 2015), 
p. 22. Google Scholar 
33. 
Saira Grant and Charlotte Peel, ‘No Passport Equals No Home’: an independent 
evaluation of the right to rent scheme (London: Joint Council for the Welfare of 
Immigrants, 2015). Google Scholar 
34. 
Patel Romil, ‘Landlord checks modern version to “no dogs, no blacks, no Irish” signs 
warns Labour’, International Business Times (11 October 2015), available 
at: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/landlord-checks-modern-version-no-dogs-no-blacks-no-
irish-signs-warns-labour-1523455. Google Scholar 
35. 
Section 4 of the 1824 Vagrancy Act was, in the 1970s, used frequently against young 
black men on the street, who could be arrested not because they had committed an 
arrestable offence but because an officer thought they were acting suspiciously as 
though they might be about to do so. It was vigorously opposed by black groups and 
eventually repealed in 1981. 
36. 
Institute of Race Relations, Police Against Black People: evidence to the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure (London: IRR, 1979), pp. 40–42. Google 
Scholar 
37. 
RAMFEL is an independent organisation whose core roles revolve around case work, 
capacity building and campaigning. 
38. 
Enforcement, in this context, refers to activities which could lead to the arrest and 
removal of a person from the country. 
39. 
See, for example, Tyler Imogen, Gill Nick, Conlon Deirdre, Oeppen Ceri, ‘The 
business of child detention: charitable co-option, migrant advocacy and activist 
outrage’, Race & Class 56, no. 1 (2014). Google Scholar 
40. 
Neocleous Mark The Fabrication of Social Order: a critical theory of police power 
(London: Pluto Press, 2000), p. xi. Google Scholar 
41. 
See Gousy Hannah, ‘The Housing and Planning Bill – creating a legal loophole for 
rogue landlords?’, Crisis (2 November 2015), available 
at: http://blog.crisis.org.uk/the-housing-and-planning-bill-creating-a-legal-loophole-
for-rogue-landlords/. Google Scholar 
42. 
Cited in Liberty, ‘Liberty’s briefing on the Immigration Bill for committee stage in 
the House of Lords: January 2016’ (London: Liberty, 2016), p. 6. 
43. 
Webber Frances ‘The inversion of accountability’, Race & Class 58, no. 2 
(2016). Google Scholar 
44. 
‘Amendments to planning bill could allow “alternative providers” to process 
planning applications’, Out-Law (16 January 2016), available at: http://www.out-
law.com/en/articles/2016/january/amendments-to-planning-bill-could-allow-
alternative-providers-to-process-planning-applications/. 
45. 
‘Prime Minister pledges to transform sink estates’, Prime Minister’s Office press 
release (10 January2016), available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-
minister-pledges-to-transform-sink-estates. 
46. 
35% campaign, ‘The Heygate Diaspora’ (8 June 2013), available 
at: http://35percent.org/blog/2013/06/08/the-heygate-diaspora/. 
47. 
Cameron David ‘Estate regeneration’, Prime Minister’s Office press release (10 
January 2016), available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/estate-
regeneration-article-by-david-cameron. 
 
